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Abstract 
In this paper we take a close look at some of the particular pathways by which 
majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that the mix 
of majoritarian and consensual institutions found within a country can influence these 
pathways quite dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for 
governability, even when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. Particularly, we 
focus on the rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, 
especially the appropriation of amendments proposed by legislators. In some presidential 
countries, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her 
to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments.   
Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the 
president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) 
depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual 
amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore 
helps to increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to 
consensual institutions and actually does not enhance legislative support for the Executive.   
 
 Keywords: consensual and majoritarian institutions; collective and individual 




In the literature on electoral institutions there is a line of thought asserting that 
electoral institutions are associated with tradeoffs. A particularly important set of tradeoffs 
involves representativeness (representation of diverse interests in the political realm) versus 
effectiveness (governability). Consensual institutions are expected to enhance the 
representation of a society’s diverse interests at some expense to effectiveness, while 
majoritarian institutions are expected to enhance governability and accountability at some 
expense to fairness of representation (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). It is also acknowledged 
that these two visions represent poles of a continuum, where virtually all-political systems 
can be viewed, not as pure specimens of either polar vision, but as hybrids combining 
consensual and majoritarian elements. This framework permits us to assume that purely 
decentralized (and therefore purely representative) systems are not viable, and that all 
countries therefore employ some majoritarian tool(s) to enhance governmental 
effectiveness.  
In this paper, we take a closer look at some of the particular pathways by which 
majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We explore how political 
institutions affect these pathways to centralize or decentralize power, and we look for 
evidence in a particularly apt case study: Brazil. On the one hand, Brazil possesses a 
complex mix of electoral institutions that allow for the representation of diverse interests, 
but that also are often blamed for encouraging levels of fragmentation and decentralization 
that can complicate the policy-making process (Ames 1995a, 1995b). On the other hand, 
Brazil possesses some “majoritarian” institutions (provisional decree, urgency petition, 2 
 
budgetary power) that centralize the agenda power and encourage national-level 
governability. We focus specifically on the Brazilian Executive’s budgetary powers.  
A key tool used by the Brazilian Executive is a line-item veto (or impoundment) 
that allows him/her to approve or strike appropriations for amendments to the budget that 
are proposed by members of Congress. Legislators are permitted to propose amendments in 
two ways: individually or collectively.
1 We argue and show, in this paper, that individual 
amendments represent a pathway by which the majoritarian features of the political system 
(e.g., presidentialism) increase the capacity of the executive to build and sustain majorities 
in Congress. However, we also demonstrate that collective amendments, while similar to 
individual amendments, represent a pathway by which the consensual features (e.g., open-
list PR) of the same political system decrease support for the executive.  
Several studies have empirically demonstrated that that the president can and does 
make strategic use of the appropriation of individual budgetary amendments (Alston and 
Mueller 2006; Pereira and Mueller 2004). In this case, the president rewards and punishes 
individual legislators and thus increases support for his agenda. These budgetary powers, 
therefore, provide a centralizing tool by which Brazilian governments have been able to 
build and maintain relatively stable ruling majority coalitions.  In this study, however, we 
take a close look at collective amendments, which to date have not received much attention 
in the literature. Collective amendments appear to be a closely related to individual 
amendments; however, rather than individually proposing amendments to the budget, in 
                                                           
1 There is a limit of 20 individual amendments per congressman and a ceiling of R$ 3.5 million. 
Similarly there is a limit of five collective amendments per standing committees; five per regional 
bloc; and ten per state bloc. 3 
 
this case legislators cooperate to collectively propose an amendment to the budget. 
Potentially, the president could also use the appropriation of collective amendments in 
order to obtain the support of legislators in Congress. As we argue below, however, 
collective amendments are linked to the consensual/decentralizing institutions of the 
Brazilian system and they possess their own internal consensual characteristics. It is 
possible, therefore, that collective amendments actually hinder the president’s influence 
over party and individual legislators’ behavior.  
Because individual amendments have a specific legislator as the author of the 
amendment the executive, who is in charge of the budget appropriation in Brazil, can 
strategically reward a faithful legislator by appropriating his/her individual amendment or 
can punish an unfaithful legislator (who did not vote according to the executive’s 
preferences in Congress) by impounding his/her amendment to the budget. The same 
strategic rationality is harder to be applied with collective amendments because the 
executive faces difficulties to identify who was the author of the amendment since, by 
definition, it has a collective authorship. By impounding a collective amendment, the 
executive would punish not only unfaithful or opposition legislators, but also important and 
faithful allies in Congress. 
Our main contribution, then, is to explore how collective amendments affect the 
Executive’s relationship with the legislature. Do these amendments represent another tool 
that the Executive can strategically use to influence the legislature, or do they provide 
legislators with an advantage that weakens the Executive and thus decentralizes power? In 
the following section, we elaborate the theory for consensual and majoritarian hybrid 
systems. We then discuss why Brazil is a useful hybrid case for testing our theory, 
especially focusing on the effects of the two kinds of amendments on legislators’ support in 4 
 
Congress. Then we empirically test the effects of collective and individual amendments on 
legislative support for the Executive. Our empirical analysis shows that while individual 
budgetary amendments clearly help the executive build and sustain majorities, the 
Executive faces more difficulties in making strategic use of collective amendments to gain 
legislative support and this reflects their connections to the consensual features of the 
Brazilian system. 
 
Theory: Hybrid Institutions (Effectiveness versus Representation) 
When electoral institutions are evaluated an important consideration is the degree to 
which they balance representativeness and effectiveness. The assumption is generally that 
as one attribute increases the other must decrease. Consensual institutions (characterized by 
proportional representation, federalism, multipartism, independent judiciary, etc.) are 
expected to enhance the representation of a society’s diverse interests at some expense to 
effectiveness, while majoritarian institutions (characterized by winner-take-all elections, 
centralized power of the executive, one-party governments) are expected to enhance 
governability and accountability at some expense to the fairness of representation (Lijphart 
1999; Norris 2004; Sartori 1994; Powell 2000).  
Consensual institutions benefit small parties and their supporters, and thereby 
provide voters with greater electoral choice and representation. Consensual institutions also 
tend to produce legislatures that more faithfully reflect the diversity of interests found in a 
society. However, the concomitant increase in legislative fragmentation and coalition 
governments may also complicate decision-making. Majoritarian systems, on the other 
hand, seek clear winners and therefore tend to concentrate power in the hands of one party. 5 
 
This outcome is viewed as enhancing stability, accountability, governability, and 
effectiveness. Indeed, one-party governments tend to last longer than coalition governments 
(though, as Cheibub (2007) argues, most coalition governments are also reasonably stable). 
One-party governments also possess a higher level of decisiveness, which makes 
government more effective and makes it easier for voters to identify who is responsible for 
policy-making. 
Yet, all systems can be considered hybrids of these two archetypes, and indeed, 
Lijphart’s work documents that virtually every political system possesses a mix of 
majoritarian and consensual institutions (Lijphart 1999). We can therefore expect to find 
both consensual and majoritarian dynamics within individual systems, each generating 
important consequences for governability and representation. To a great extent, the 
functioning of democracy can be viewed as dependent on its mix of majoritarian and 
consensual institutions. We assume that purely consensual regimes are ineffective and in 
fact do not exist. Virtually all countries employ some form of majoritarian tools. In many 
cases, for example, countries use moderate electoral thresholds (where parties are required 
to win a certain percentage of the national vote before they are granted seats) to reduce 
fractionalization and thus enhance governability. In other cases, presidentialism (via strong 
executives) is meant to enhance effectiveness. This has been, in fact, the dominant 
institutional combination in Latin America.
2  
                                                           
2 The U.S. is a good example of a mixed system in which several consensual features 
(presidentialism, federalism, bi-cameralism, independent judiciary, etc.) live together with the 
majoritarian electoral rules. 6 
 
In this paper, we take a more detailed look at some of the particular pathways by 
which majoritarian and consensual institutions affect governability. We demonstrate that 
the mix of majoritarian and consensual institutions can influence these pathways quite 
dramatically, such that they produce rather different consequences for governability, even 
when these pathways are relatively similar in nature. More specifically, we focus on the 
rules governing the relationship between the President and the Legislature, especially the 
appropriation of legislators’ amendments. In some presidential countries, like Brazil and 
Colombia, the president possesses a partial veto (or a line-item veto) which allows him/her 
to approve or strike appropriations, which legislators introduce in amendments.   
Concentrating on the case of Brazil, we argue and demonstrate that whether or not the 
president can use this tool to sustain governing majorities (i.e., to increase governability) 
depends on the kind of amendment introduced by legislators. One kind, individual 
amendment, is linked to the majoritarian institution of a powerful presidency and therefore 
helps increase governability. A second kind, collective amendment, is linked to consensual 
institutions and actually decreases governability.   
Hybridism in Brazil 
Brazil represents a particularly appropriate case for this study because it possesses a 
complex mix of consensual and majoritarian institutions. On the one hand, Brazil possesses 
electoral institutions that are often blamed for excessively decentralizing power and thus 
complicating the policy-making process (Ames 1995a, 2001; Mainwaring 1997; Ames 
1995b). Brazil uses an open-list PR system with virtually no national effective threshold. 
Open-list PR leads to party fragmentation and encourages voters to support candidates 
based on personal qualities and activities and this encourages individual legislators to 7 
 
cultivate direct relationships with local constituencies rather than doing so through national 
parties. This also gives state parties (instead of national parties) influence in the selection of 
legislative candidates. Brazil also possesses a federal system with multiple veto points, or 
points at which legislation can bog down. These factors, it is argued, have helped make 
Brazil’s party system among the most fragmented in the world. This combination of 
institutions is expected to contribute to the decentralization of power and to a reduction in 
governmental effectiveness. 
Notwithstanding these tendencies for gridlock, researchers have found that Brazil 
has managed to cope with the decentralizing nature of its consensual institutions, largely by 
relying on the centralizing powers of its majoritarian institutions. Though presidential 
regimes, especially with multipartism (Mainwaring 1993), have been regarded as prone to 
institutional deadlock (e.g., Linz and Valenzuela 1994), it has been shown that in Brazil the 
constitutional powers of the president act to centralize power (Figueiredo and Limongi 
2000; Shugart and Carey 1992; Amorim Neto 2003; Alston and Mueller 2006; Amorim 
Neto et al. 2003; Pereira and Mueller 2004). These and other studies suggest that variables 
internal to the decision-making process (e.g., rules by which the Congress operates and the 
degree of cabinet proportionality) and the institutional legislative powers held by the 
president (decree and veto powers, the right to introduce new legislation, permission to 
request urgency time limits on certain bills, discretionary powers over budget 
appropriation, etc.) set the agenda of the Congress and influence the behavior of legislators 
in a way that promotes governability. 
In this paper we are particularly concerned with one of the important links between 
Brazil’s centralizing institutions and its decentralizing electoral rules: legislator 
amendments to the budget. In Brazil, the Executive first proposes the budget bill and 8 
 
legislators consequently have the opportunity to add amendments before returning the 
budget law to the Executive. The Executive possesses a line-item veto and thus can decide 
to leave in or strike appropriations for a given legislator’s amendment. The main 
instruments used by the Executive for this purpose have been the “impoundment decrees” 
(decretos de contingenciamento), through which expenditures that have been approved in 
the budget law are suspended, integrally or partially, and made contingent on the evolution 
of the fiscal situation. As the year progresses the expenditures can be “un-impounded,” but 
more frequently remain suspended to help achieve the primary surplus targets. Therefore, it 
is the executive who is entitled to determine which amendment will really be appropriated, 
making the budget contingent on the amount of available resources in the national treasury. 
The amendments proposed by legislators can take either of two forms. They can be 
proposed by individual legislators or they can be proposed by groups of legislators. In 
Brazil, the rules regarding budget amendments have varied considerably over time. Prior to 
1993 only individual legislators could propose unrestricted (with respect to the number and 
value) amendments to the Executive’s annual budget bill. In 1993, a budget scandal erupted 
in Congress, and consequently, an important set of institutional changes were adopted. 
Perhaps most importantly, Resolution nº1 06/93-CN was introduced, allowing standing 
committees, regional blocs, and state blocs (bancadas estaduais) to collectively amend the 
budget bill.
3 For the annual budgets of 1994 and 1995 amendments were accepted from 
                                                           
3 This Resolution nº 1 also restricted the number of individual amendments for each legislator to 
fifty. Resolution nº 2/95-CN further reduced the number of amendments to 20. The preliminary 
budget report made by the General Budget Committee Reporter set a ceiling of R$ 1.5 million as 
the total amount of amendments per legislator. Recently, legislators decided to increase the value of 9 
 
four sources: standing committees, political parties, state blocs, and individual legislators. 
Later, Resolution nº2 2/95-CN specified that political parties could no longer collectively 
amend the budget, but the resolution preserved the right of standing committees, regional 
blocs, state blocs, and individual legislators to continue amending the budget bill. This 
Resolution also established new rules for collective amendments, restricting the number 
that can be introduced to 5 per standing committee, 5 per regional bloc, and 10 per state 
bloc. 
This self-restriction by legislators, in the direction of reducing the capacity of 
individual legislators to amend the budget, can be interpreted as an attempt to rationalize 
and better coordinate the amendment process. By giving priority to collective amendments, 
they (especially legislators from the governing majority coalition) hoped to reduce the large 
number of disputes among legislators and thereby ensure approval of their proposals. In 
other words, in a crisis situation produced by the budget scandal the ability of legislators to 
continue amending the budget was under serious threat giving that individual amendments 
were seen as the major source of corruption that led to the scandal. Legislators thus were 
spurred to provide a clear self-disciplinary signal to their electorate while at the same time 
preserving their ability to keep amending the budget. The choice at that moment was “to 
lose their rings but preserve their fingers” in the budgetary process. It is true that legislators 
are currently more constrained by the resolutions with respect to their ability to individually 
amend the budget, but they may have also found a new way of safeguarding their ability to 
interfere in the budget process via these collective amendments.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
this quota to R$ 2.5 million and this year they decided to increase this ceiling to R$ 3.5 million 
Reais for each legislator. 10 
 
We explain below that the distinction between individual and collective 
amendments produces important consequences for governability. On the one hand, we 
argue that individual amendments are linked to majoritarian institutions, especially 
presidential power, and thus they encourage governability. On the other hand, we argue that 
collective amendments are connected to consensual institutions and also possess their own 
consensual characteristics, and consequently they decrease governability. These 
relationships are summarized in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1] 
Before proceeding to discuss the dynamics of individual and collective 
amendments, we note that our conceptualization of governability is based on frequently 
considered notion: the ability of governments to make policy decisively (see, for example, 
Coppedge (2001) Foweraker (1998) and Mainwaring (1993)). More specifically, we focus 
on the ability of Executives to pull together legislative majorities that will support their 
agendas. In the discussions that follow, then, we are concerned with whether or not 
Brazilian presidents can use individual and collective amendments to increase legislative 
support for their agendas. 
 
Individual Amendments 
Individual amendments have received considerable attention in the literature. 
Several studies have shown that the execution of individual amendments has been used 
strategically by the Executive in exchange for legislative support (Alston and Mueller 2006; 
Alston et al. 2004; Pereira and Mueller 2004; Pereira and Renno 2003). Because candidates 
in open-list electoral systems must compete against other candidates, including from their 11 
 
own party, pork-barreling becomes an important factor contributing to their chances of 
reelection (Pereira and Renno (2003). In exchange for pork, therefore, legislators are more 
likely to support the Executive’s agenda, and in this way individual amendments help 
centralize political power and help maintain stable ruling majority coalitions.  
Party leaders play a fundamental role in this process working as bridges linking the 
demands of individual legislators and the Executive’s political agenda (Pereira and Mueller 
2003: 739). They concentrate a lot of institutional prerogatives such as: appointing and 
substituting members of committees at any time; adding in or withdrawing proposals in the 
legislative agenda; deciding if a bill would have an urgency procedure; indicating the 
position of the party regarding a bill at the floor; and fundamentally, negotiating with the 
Executive the demands of the members of his/her party. This is why the political parties are 
so strong within the legislative arena in Brazil. 
The above literature indicates that deputies that provided more support through their 
voting behavior in Congress have most of their individual amendments appropriated by the 
Executive. Also, those deputies that switched their votes in favor of the Executive’s 
proposal were additionally rewarded and those that switched contrary to the Executive were 
punished. Thus, for the individual amendments, the Executive not only has the power to 
veto these amendments, but more importantly, the Executive can exercise extreme 
discretion in deciding whether or not to execute (appropriate) these amendments. These 
studies suggest, therefore, that individual budget amendments are important tools through 






Many of the amendments made to the Executive’s budget proposal are not 
individual but are rather collective amendments, in which several legislators pool together 
to add a claim to the budget. Despite the fact that the use of collective amendments has 
risen dramatically and that they represent larger expenditures than individual amendments 
(Samuels 2002), they have not been extensively studied. In this section we discuss 
collective amendments and argue that they cannot be expected to function similarly to 
individual amendments. We argue that the nature of state amendments empowers 
legislators in relation to the Executive and therefore decentralizes power.  
Because collective amendments have the direct support of more than one legislator, 
it is assumed that these kinds of amendments have a greater probability of approval 
(Figueiredo & Limongi 2007). Indeed, collective amendments represent approximately 
67% of the total resources that have been allocated by Congress in recent years; twice as 
much as individual amendments (33%). According to data from the Joint Budget 
Committee of the Brazilian Congress, from 1997 to 2005 the amount of resources allocated 
as collective amendments was, on average, about R$ 1.043 billion per year (See Table 1).  
[Table 1 about here] 
Because of data constraints, we focus our discussion and analysis of collective 
amendments particularly to state block amendments.
4 Although Resolution nº2 stipulates up 
to 10 collective amendments as the maximum number available to each state delegation, 
                                                           
4 We believe, however, that the same rationale is applicable to amendments from ‘standing 
committees’ and ‘regional bloc amendments,’ as well. Nevertheless, we suggest that this is a topic 
for future investigation.  13 
 
there is no rule establishing either a maximum or a minimum value. According to our data, 
state block amendments have broadly ranged from R$ 4.3 million to R$ 751 million. This 
tremendous variation suggests that the legislators’ room for budgetary maneuvering and 
autonomy on collective amendments is extremely high. 
Theoretically, the Executive could face difficulties in using collective amendments 
strategically to reward and punish legislators, in the ways observed with individual 
amendments. To begin with, collective amendments encourage more shirking because they 
have no single author and consequently the Executive is not able to directly observe who 
can claim credit for collective amendments and the direct payoffs to individual legislators 
generated by them. At the same time, legislators are still able to claim credit for the benefits 
produced by collective amendments to their constituency network. By constituency 
network we mean not only voters, but also the set of local political players (such as mayors, 
local legislators, bureaucrats, etc.) who can observe much more clearly the effort of the 
national representative in bringing resources to the specific municipality via collective 
amendments. As long as the benefits obtained by the national representative feed players of 
these local political networks they will be motivated to politically support the national 
legislator, to gather more votes in the electorate as one way to pay back the legislator. 
Naturally, every legislator of a particular state would try to claim credit for appropriating 
collective amendments at the local level. However, we expect that the legislator most 
skilled in providing resources will be better positioned to obtain greater recognition in the 
local political market.  
Legislators, especially from the smallest states, also have the flexibility to 
informally cooperate and combine some of the individual amendments in a manner that 
disguises them as collective ones. Such amendments are known as rachadinhas. According 14 
 
to Deputy Sergio Miranda (PC do B-MG), “almost 40% of the collective amendments have 
been systematically used in the form of rachadinhas to benefit electoral strongholds of 
individual legislators.”
5 A similar complaint was offered by the previous president of the 
Joint Budget Committee and now the current Ministry of Finance, Deputy Paulo Bernardo 
(PT – PR), who said that “several legislators are using state block amendments as if they 
were individual ones in order to deliver resources to their electoral bailiwicks. I am certain 
this is a distortion of the original purpose of collective instruments.”
6 More recently, the 
Deputy Paulo Bernardo pointed out that “the state block amendments became large 
camouflaged individual amendments.”
7  
Another reason to suspect that collective amendments cannot be used by the 
Executive to attain political support is that they also use what can be considered consensual 
decision-making rules that encourage cooperation among block members rather than with 
the Executive. Approval of state amendments to the budget law requires the support of at 
least two-thirds of the Senators and Deputies of each state delegation. That is, without the 
compliance of a super-majority of state legislators no state amendment can be approved. 
Bear in mind that we are talking here about a very strong party fragmentation in which the 
governors’ party rarely gets the majority of seats in State Assemblies though governors are 
able to build post-electoral majority coalitions. This is clearly a consensual requirement that 
encourages cooperation among legislators from different parties and ideological 
preferences. Since the size of the pie is large on state amendments, there is no incentive for 
                                                           
5 Folha de São Paulo, November 13, 2001. 
6 Correio Braziliense, December 20, 2004. 
7 Valor, January 14, 2005. 15 
 
a legislator to stay out of the state bloc and to sign the petition for a collective amendment. 
Which state amendments are included in the budget bill is determined in a meeting in 
which state delegation members also choose who will be the coordinator of the delegation. 
This is a key position since the coordinator will be in charge of demanding inclusion of the 
delegation’s amendments in the report of the Budgetary Joint Committee and will be in 
charge during the phase of budget execution. That is, as soon as the Executive decides to 
appropriate a state amendment, it is the state bloc coordinator who informs the Executive 
branch how a wide-ranging amendment should be allocated. This means that as soon as the 
Executive opens the gate by determining the execution of the collective bill the President 
loses control over which lucky legislator will get to claim credit for delivering the policy.  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Another consensual peculiarity of state amendments is tied to the decentralized 
process of reporting budgetary bills in the Joint Budget Committee. The distribution of bills 
among committee members follows the rule of proportionality according to the number of 
seats each political party holds. That is, not only faithful members of the governing 
coalition have the prerogative of reporting a budget bill, but any member of the committee 
could do this. According to Deputy Paulo Bernardo, “it is not uncommon to see members 
of the budget committee pressing for a favorable report regarding a budget bill of the 
interest of the Executive because it incorporated legislators’ individual demands.”
8  
In the investigated period, about 80% of state amendments were concentrated in six 
governmental agencies: Department of Roads (about 20%), Secretary of Urban 
Development (around 20%), Ministry of National Integration (around 20%), National 
                                                           
8 Personal interview with Deputy Paulo Bernardo in his office, Brasilia, June 24, 2005. 16 
 
Health Fund (around 15%), and Ministry of Transportation (around 5%). The amendments 
typically took the form of umbrella amendments
9 in the areas of transportation, health, and 
urban infra-structure. There is no specific geographical target for these umbrella 
amendments, unlike the vast majority of individual amendments. This characteristic, along 
with the absence of an identifiable author, also makes it more difficult for the Executive to 
trace the interests involved and to identify which legislators would benefit from the 
appropriation of these collective amendments. 
These are some reasons the current Lula’s administration has been generating clear 
signals that it intends to revamp the existing rules about state amendments. This position is 
reflected in recent comments made by the previous President of the Worker’s Party (PT), 
Deputy Jose Genoino, in a nation-wide newspaper: 
“State Block amendments are extremely valuable in terms of resources; 
however, they have no ‘Social Security Number’ neither ‘Identification 
Number.’ Thus we cannot identify the author. It is true that individual 
amendments are problematic, especially because they pulverize resources, 
sometimes in an inefficient way. Nevertheless, their value is small and, most 
importantly, they do have a ‘social security number,’ which makes then 
easier to control. Before the Inquiry Parliamentary Committee – CPI, which 
investigated the budget scandal in 1992, the individual amendments were 
even more problematic since there was no ceiling in the value or limit in the 
number of amendments a legislator could craft. The Congress thought, at 
that time, that state block amendments would be an alternative. However, 
                                                           
9 Similar to what Shepsle and Weingast (1995: 11) called an Omnibus amendment.  17 
 
they turned out to be today as a big problem because individual deputies 
have exploited this opportunity to use collective amendments privately.”
10  
Another indication of the Executive’s extreme concern over collective amendments 
was the decision of the Lula’s administration to shut off the appropriation of R$ 7.8 billion 
worth of collective amendments that had been already authorized in the budget law of 
2005. Moreover, the government behaved in a different manner with regard to individual 
amendments. Instead of impounding appropriations, as was the case for collective 
amendments, the government decided to appropriate R$ 2 billion for the individual 
amendments.
11 The Executive appears to have realized that unfaithful legislators both from 
his coalition and from opposition parties were exploiting this collective instrument to gain 
access to public resources without having to provide political support for the Executive’s 
agenda.  
While collective amendments may strengthen legislators relative to the Executive, 
their approval in the annual budget law does not necessarily guarantee that funds will be 
appropriated, since the appropriation of these amendments is a prerogative of the 
Executive. Only 78.29% of the collective amendments approved were appropriated in the 
period of analysis.  
Because of these dynamics, we seek to test if a similar relationship to the one found 
for individual amendments (that we also tested here) can also be established between 
legislators’ support for the presidential agenda and the appropriation of state block 
collective amendments. Our key contribution, therefore, is to empirically investigate 
                                                           
10 Valor, February 18, 2005. 
11 Folha de São Paulo, February 22, 2005. 18 
 
whether legislators’ use of state amendments can divert resources from the executive 
without supporting the executive’s agenda. If it is the case, the execution of collective 
amendments raises important questions about government effectiveness. Do state 
amendments represent another carrot and stick that the Executive can use to influence the 
legislature, or the consensual characteristics of collective amendments actually encourage 
the decentralization of resources away from the Executive’s control? 
 
Data and Methods 
To analyze the relationship between collective amendments and legislative support, 
we collected a monthly time series dataset that runs from January 1997 to December 2005. 
This amounts to 108 time points, spanning Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s two 
administrations and the first three years of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s first term in office. 
The dataset includes two key variables: a variable representing the absolute monetary value 
of appropriations for state amendments and a variable representing the level of support 
provided by a state delegation for presidential preferences. We operationalize legislative 
support as the average of legislators from a particular state delegation in the Chamber of 
Deputies supporting executive’s positions on legislative votes in a given month. This 
variable indicates the revealed preference of legislators in a state delegation regarding 
presidential preferences. 
We also control for the influence of individual amendments, the popularity of the 
president,  cabinet coalescence at the national level, and we add dummy variables 
representing each administration. Controlling for individual amendments allows us to 
compare how the effects of collective amendments differ from those of individual 19 
 
amendments. For presidential popularity, several studies have found that this factor is 
linked to higher legislative influence (Brace and Hinckley 1992; Ostrom Jr and Simon 
1985; Rivers and Rose 1985). These findings lead us to expect, therefore, that the value of 
appropriations will decline as the president’s popularity increases because this will allow 
the president to reduce his/her reliance on budgetary powers. A very popular president 
would need to rely less often on monetary transfers to obtain legislative support. Cabinet 
coalescence measures the partisan distribution of ministerial portfolios. Cabinet 
coalescence increases as the proportionality between the parties’ share of cabinet portfolios 
and their share of seats in the legislature increases (Amorim Neto 2002). A higher degree of 
coalescence should mean that there is a more stable and satisfied coalition supporting the 
president. This suggests that coalition parties will have a greater influence on the 
presidential agenda and will therefore work harder to implement it. This should also 
decrease the president’s reliance on appropriations of amendments. Raile, Pereira, and 
Power (2008) arrive at a similar conclusion, demonstrating empirically that pork and 
cabinet positions have interdependent effects and function as imperfect substitutes in 
purchasing legislative support. 
Preliminary analysis of the data suggests that the dependent variable (legislative 
support) is affected by an AR(1) autoregressive process. Therefore, to address this problem 
we use two estimation techniques. First, we run an ordinary least squares model in which 
we correct for the seasonal nature of the data by including dummy variables for the months 
of February to December. Second, we use a Prais-Winsten estimation method, which 20 
 
specifically corrects for first-order autoregressive errors.
12 For both approaches, we use the 
logs of state amendments and individual amendments because we expect that the effects of 
these variables diminish at the margins. 
In sum, we expect that if state amendments are strategically appropriated by the 
Executive (as in the case of individual amendments), the relationship between the 
appropriation of state amendments and legislator support for the Executive’s preferences 
should be positive. That is, as the Executive increases the appropriation of state 
amendments this should increase the legislative support for presidential preferences by 
members in a state delegation. On the other hand, based on institutional difficulties 
generated by the unique nature of collective amendments—such as reducing the 
identifiability of the author of the amendment—it is reasonable to expect that individual 
legislators have some room to maneuver and that they may therefore go against presidential 
preferences without fear of being punished. If this is the case, we should expect no 
relationship or even a negative relationship between state delegation support for 
presidential preferences and the appropriation of state amendments.  
 
                                                           
12 For a discussion of these approaches see Wooldridge (2003: 404-405). Furthermore, we 
considered using a two-stage least squares model to control for potential endogeneity of the 
appropriation of individual and collective amendments, following Pereira and Mueller (2004) and 
Alston and Mueller (2006). However, we deemed a two-stage model impractical for a number of 
reasons. The time-series control in the empirical specification, which we feel is essential, 
complicates use of a two-stage model. In addition, the theoretical endogeneity between pork and 
legislative support is not as clear in the aggregate as it is at the individual level. 21 
 
Results 
The results of the OLS regression, reported in Table 2, suggest that state 
amendments do in fact produce an effect contrary to individual amendments. For the 
standard OLS regression, the signs of the coefficients for these two explanatory variables 
are reversed. In line with past studies, individual amendments produce a positive and 
significant influence on legislative support at below the .01 level. State amendments, on the 
other hand, produce a negative and significant influence on legislative support at the .10 
level. Substantively, a 100% increase in the value of individual amendments increases 
legislative support by approximately 3%, while a 10% increase in the value of state 
amendments decreases support by approximately 3%.
13 These effects are large enough to 
influence the outcome of close votes. 
[Table 2 about here] 
These results were also confirmed by the Prais-Winsten estimation.
14 In this model, 
the effects of state amendments and individual amendments are both significant and again 
in oriented in opposite directions. Once the AR(1) autoregressive process is accounted for, 
the effects of state amendments on legislative support are found to be significantly 
negative, while the effects of individual amendments are significantly positive. 
Substantively, the magnitude of the effects are similar to what we found in the standard 
OLS model; a 100% increase in the value of state amendments reduces legislative support 
                                                           
13 See Wooldridge (2003: 124-6) for an explanation on interpreting logged independent variables. 
14 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 22 
 
by approximately 3%, while a 100% increase in the value of individual amendments 
increases legislative support by approximately 4%.
15  
It is interesting to note at this point that the results with respect to individual 
amendments contravene dissenting views about the role of individual amendments on 
legislators’ behavior within Congress. For example, Figueiredo and Limongi (2007) claim 
that it is not possible to establish a causal relationship that votes are exchanged for the 
execution of individual amendments. This claim, which is essentially based on descriptive 
evidence of frequency distribution, suggests that “amendments can be executed without the 
expected voting behavior, and votes are cast in support of the government without the 
expected matching part – i.e., authorization of spending (3).” The authors also provide a 
simple logistic regression showing that, although the rate of execution of individual 
amendments is positively correlated with legislative support for the executive’s agenda, it is 
a model with less predictive capacity than a model with membership of government 
coalition alone. We have demonstrated, however, that using a time-series analysis and 
controlling for other factors that may influence legislators’ vote behavior reveals that 
appropriation of individual amendments on the national budget positively increases 
legislative support in Congress.   
With respect to other explanatory variables the models produce some conflicting 
results. Presidential popularity is not significant in the standard OLS regression, but it is 
positive and significantly (at the .1 level) related to legislative support in the Prais-Winsten 
                                                           
15 We also ran this model using robust standard errors and we found that the results for state 
amendments remain the same. For individual amendments, the significance level was reduced to a 
P-value of .09. 23 
 
model. This result should be interpreted with caution because it appears influenced by the 
absence of the dummy for the Lula administration (dropped by Stata because of 
collinearity). Dropping the Lula variable in the standard OLS model did increase the size of 
the coefficient for presidential popularity, though it still did not become significant in that 
model. Cabinet coalescence was not significant for either model. With respect to the 
administration dummies, the standard OLS regression suggests that the Lula administration 
was more successful than the Cardoso government in generating legislative support. Again, 
this result should be interpreted with caution because we were unable to obtain results for 
the Prais-Winsten model. Unfortunately, exploring the effects of this variable more closely 
will require the collection of more data across a greater number of administrations.   
Ultimately, we want to emphasize that our results clearly show that individual and 
state amendments are not equivalent. Our results support the conclusions of past research 
on individual amendments -- they positively increase support for the Executive. For state 
amendments, however, the evidence from both models (the standard OLS model and in the 
Prais-Winsten model) indicates that they cannot be used to increase legislative support; 
indeed, they significantly decrease support for the Executive.  
 
Conclusion 
This study explored how hybrid electoral institutions can produce varying effects 
with respect to governability. Focusing on Brazil, we found that even a relatively small 
difference between particular institutions (i.e., individual versus state amendments) can 
lead to rather different outcomes. Our findings suggest that, at least for the time period we 
analyzed, state amendments do not work like individual amendments; they do not represent 24 
 
another tool which the Executive can use to gain the legislature’s support for his agenda. 
The Executive does not receive support from legislators in return for state amendment 
appropriations.  
On the contrary, our results suggest that state amendments provide legislators with 
advantages over the Executive. As noted in our theoretical discussion, collective 
amendments allow legislators to obscure their amendment input and because of their own 
internal consensual characteristics they encourage members of legislative blocks to 
cooperate with each other rather than with the executive.  Thus, to the extent that legislative 
support proxies for governmental effectiveness, we can conclude that greater use of 
collective amendments (relative to individual amendments) will have a negative effect on 
governability.  
We are not suggesting that collective amendments are inherently negative 
institutions; indeed, future work may find, for example, that collective amendments may 
produce a more efficacious allocation of resources than individual amendments. But it is 
important to keep in mind that the institutional setting that emerged from the 1988 
Constitution was a consequence of legislative’s choice. The legislature essentially decided 
to delegate a bulk of the power to the Executive, including the power of unilaterally 
executing the budget. The underlying rationale for this was to prevent institutional 
instability and deadlock between Congress and the Executive, which was prevalent in the 
previous period of democratic rule (from 1946 to 1964). The majority of legislators learned 
from the 22 years of dictatorship that an institutionally weak president could not last 
without some sort of governing capacity to enforce his/her agenda. Legislators decided not 
to change the electoral rules--that is, not to reform the PR open-list system in the new 
constitution because it would create too much uncertainty with respect to the legislators’ 25 
 
electoral survival—but they also opted to transfer institutional resources to the Executive to 
ensure governability.  
The most important consequence of this institutional design was that all elected 
presidents since 1988 have been able to build reasonably stable post-electoral majority 
coalitions within Congress and have experienced relatively strong party discipline within 
the presidential governing coalition, along with a high level of governability. In fact, Brazil 
has not yet faced a truly divided government under the current set of political institutions. 
This is not coincidental, given the institutional powers and resources held and selectively 
distributed by the Executive. The combination of provisional decree, vetoes, urgency 
petitions, and budget dominance provides the Executive with an impressive set of 
instruments for imposing its own legislative priorities on Congress’ agenda.  26 
 






























Table 1: Distribution of Executed Individual and Collective Amendments (1997-2005) 









































Average  520,098,321 1,043,014,127  1,563,112,448 



























Note: Statistical significance denoted by *; where * equals p-value < 0.1,  




Table 2: Determinants of Legislative Support (Governability) 
 OLS  Regression 
Prais-Winsten 
Estimation 
Variable Coefficient  Coefficient 
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